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DEAN Rv LE STREET, 
LONDON, S. W. 1 
6111 September. 1967 
To: The Right HOllourable the Secretary of State 
for the Home Departmellt. 
1 have the honour to report that in obedience to the Order dated 3rd April, 
1967 made under Section 14  of the Petroleum (Consolidation) Act, 1 928, 1 
have held an inquiry into the causes of, and circumstances attending, the <-Iccident 
by fire and explosion which occurred on 1st April. 1967 at the premises orthe 
Esso Petroleum Company Limited at Bedfont Road, Stanwell, Middlesex. 
An Interim Report was submitted to you on 15th May. 1 967; J now submit my 
Fi nal Report. 
Casualties 
By this accident three l ives were lost and eleven other persons were injured, 
one of them seriously namely: 
Killed 
















Aged 54 years 
Aged 50 years 
Aged 35 years 
Aged 49 years 
Aged 39 years 
Aged 16 years 
Aged 44 years 
Aged 35 years 
Aged 30 years 
Aged 50 years 
Aged 39 years 
Aged 45 years 
Aged 40 years 
Aged 33 years 
Of the injured, Dorothea Dene and Muriel Pay suffered from shock while 
Ronald Stone and Peter Jay suffered injury escaping from the premises. The 
remainder suffered injury as a direct consequence of the fire. One of them as at 
Ihis t ime, namely George Betts, is still under constant medical care. 
Inquest 
I attended an Inquest held at the Coroner's Court at Chensey on 6th April, 
1 967 when evidence of identification was given. The inquest was then adjourned 
pending results of the inquiry ordered by the Secretary of State. At the resumed 
i nquest, at the same court, on 3 1st July, 1967 I gave evidence. The Coroner, 
sitting with a jury, returned a verdict of Accidental Death. 
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Material damage 
The fire and explosion caused the almost complete dc,!,truclIon of a Ime 
of stands used for loading road tank-wagons and, in addll ion, nmeteen vehicles 
varying in size from 1,800 gallons capacity to 4,000 gallons were destroyed. 
The total loss has been estimated at nearly £ 500,000. (Plate No. 1 5) 
Description of the premises 
The premises of the Esso Petroleum Company Limited at Stam ..ell are 
known as the WCM London Terminal v. hich is  sit u3ted 14 miles west of London 
close to the southern perimeter of London (Heathrov.) Airport. The e�lstcrn 
boundary of the flight path safety zone of the airport from No. 5 runway crosses 
the terminal townrds thc north-west; all places on thc'terminal where petroleum 
spirit is handled or exposed are outside the Hight path risk zone from aircrafl . 
TheSIlu3tion and the lay-out of the site are shown in Plan No. I; an aerial view, 
which, in essential features, is the same as at the time of the ,\ccident, was taken 
in 196 5 and is shown in Plate No. I. The total \ite occupies about 33 
acres. 
The terminal is of recent construction, being commissioned as from March 
196 5 0nwtHds. It functions as a distribution depot, receiving its products by 
pipe-line from the Esso Refinery at Fawley near Southampton, and distributing 
them by road and by pipe-line to destinations in and around the London area. 
It is licensed by the Staines Urban District Council for the storage of about 
25,000,000 gallons of petroleum products of 1 0\" and high Hash-poInt .  The whole 
of the site is within the licensed area. The construction of the �ite and the term!) 
of l icence correspond to the recommendations oflhe Home Office Model Code 
for such premises. 
The terminal consists essentially of a storage area located at the :)outhern 
end: a set of road tanker-vehicle loading stands opposite v. hich, on the western 
side, is situated the administrative and control buildlllg; workshops towards 
the northern end; parking facilities and a wash bay for road tan]..er-\Chicles. 
Access to  the terminal is at the northern end through controlled gates (Plate 
No. 2) opening on to a shor! road leading to Bedfollt Road. AI the 
southern end is an <'iccess road for use in emergency by fire appliances. This 
road, closed by locked gates at both ends, leads into Short Lane. The whole 
terminal is enclosed by an "unclimbable" wire-mesh fence surmounted by 
strands of barbed wire. 
The storage area 
I n the storage area products are kept in a number of steel tanks of various 
capacities. These tanks have a maximum height of 42 feet. which is a require­
ment placed upon the Company by the needs of aircraft plouing at London 
Airport, and of a diameter up to a present maximum of 1 2 feet. An additional 
tank of 1 28 feet in diameter has been constructed \Cry recently and will come 
into commission in the near future; this tank is not shown in Plan No. I or in 
Plate No. 1 .  Planning permission has been given for one more tank of 1 2 
feet d iameter. 
With one exception products of low Hash-point are stored in Hoating-roof 
tanks, which are essentially safe as there is no vapour space within them, while 
products of high flash-point are kept in cone-roof (or fixed roof) tanks. The 
tanks are located within bunded areas divided by intermediate walls in con­
ventional fashion. The bunds are of a capacity. as is usual, 10 contain the 
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contents of the largest tank within the bund plus 1 0  per cent of the aggregate 
capacity of the remainder. The bund walls, of earth const ruclion, are surmounted 
by concrete walls which, amongst other things, would give some protection 
to fire-fighting personnel in emergency. 
All tanks are fitled with water sprays on the outside for cooling purposes 
in the event of a fire. Foam injectors are fiued i n  order to put foam, in emer­
gency. into the cone-roof tanks or on 10 the roof of the float ing-rooftanks. Both 
water and foam are controlled from outside the bunds. 
Additional safety features comprise fusible links which, in the event of a 
fire, serve to enable valves to close automatically on the outlet side of the tanks; 
non-return valves are fitled to the inlet side. By-passes to the tank valves enable 
pressure i n  the pipe-lines to be relieved into the tanks in the event of the pipe's 
being involved in a fire. 
The measures adopled i n  the �Iorage area can be said, therefore, to make 
this area as safe as is reasonably practicable. 
Products, which arc pumped from Fawley, arc received at the extreme 
.!Iouthern cnd of the terminal whence by appropriate controls they arc directed 
into the correct storage tanks. 
Pipe-lines taking products out of the terminal run more or less along the 
western boundary of the establishment. 
At no time was the storage area involved, or likely to be involved, in the 
fire that occurred. For:1 t ime the overground pipe-lines were compromised by a 
runaway blazing vehicle which slopped astride them, but otherwise the fire 
was confined to the road loading facilities. 
Fire-fighting facilities 
Within the storage area and adjacent 10 the terminal end of the access 
road are kept a foam tender, foam trailers and a high-capacity foam monitor, 
together with additional stocks of foam compound i n  cans. The remaining 
facilities are referred to i n  Appendix I. 
By mutual understanding, fire-fighting i� the responsibility of the outside 
brigades. Terminal personnel are only concerned with first-aid measures and in 
rendering preliminary assistance to the Brigades when they are called in. Their 
functions are to open the gates of the access road, and to start up the waler­
pumps and the foam appliance. If necessary they would also operate the tank­
drenching system in the storage area. 
Road loading facilities-General 
The road loading facilit ies are shown in Plan No. 2. They consisted of 
nine double-sided loading stands running due north and south. The vehicles 
positions were numbered I to 18 in the same sense. The stands dispensed about 
one million gallons daily of assorted products. 
Products were taken by pipe-lines from the storage tanks to the base of 
each of the loading slands and thence via filters, control valves and meters to 
loading arms which were located on platforms accessible from the ground by 
means of iron steps (Plate No. 3). 
The loading arms, of which there were up to five in number on each side 
of the loading stand, were arranged to swivel through about 1800 and were 
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capable of a large up and down vertical movement to enable them to be put 
Into and taken out of the compartments of road tankers. A self-balancing 
arrangement kept them in the hoisted position when not in use. In  all there were 
sixty-two loading arms on the loading stands. 
In  themselves the loading arms consisted of lengths of four inch diameter 
metal piping. which were joined together by specially constructed knuckles 
(un iversal joints) which enabled the pipe assemblies to assume various positions 
so facilitating loading of vehicles which came into the loading stands. The ends 
of the final lengths of pipe (drop-tubes) terminated in a T-head. deHecting pro­
duct i n  filling operations at right angles to the run of the pipes. Each T-head 
was provided with a neoprene rubber cushion, secured by an aluminium strap 
fixed to the pipe by mild steel bifurcated rivets, in order to prevent mechanical 
damage to the tanks into which i t  was placed in filling operations. 
Each loading arm was de;)igned to load at a maximum rate of 500 gallons 
per minute; a mercury switch on each arm actuated the pumps for product 
delivery when the arm was in the down (filling) position. Filling was accom­
plished. through open manholes, by the drivers standing on the cat-walks of 
the tanks of the vehicles at the same level as the loading arm platforms. Figure 
I shows the schemat iC arr3ngements of the loading arm; Plates Nos. 3,4, 5 and 6 
show the general fillmg arrangements and posillons of vehicles at the loading 
stands. 
Loading-automatic control 
Following earlier trials in Aberdeen and elsewhere, equipment Vi as installed 
towards the end of 1966 to replace an existing manual control system; this new 
equipment was designed to load road tankers automatically to the desired 
amounts. I L  was based, modified in  the light of experience, on that operated 
at Aberdeen which was the proving ground for the principles of this automatic 
system. It was ordered from the contractors early in 1966 and was subjected 
to exhaustive tests at the contractors' works in August at which time other 
modifications were made. Installation al the Terminal began about September 
and was completed by December. 
The new equipment involved alterations to some of the features of the 
existing loading stand� and brought into use new methods of control and 
recording. I t  was said to increase the safety of operations on the loading stands: 
it  speeded up operations, for it enabled loading of a number of compartments 
to be carried out simultaneously. so making for more efficient use of plant 
and men; t here was marc accurate control of the product and record-keeping 
by means of a data-logging and it allowed a certain amount of self-service by 
authorised dealers. It had a further advantage in that only known personnel 
who had their own individual key-cards could draw product from the stands. 
The system incorporated interlocks which operated to prevent product being 
drawn from the loading arms unless certain conditions were satisfied, or in the 
event of faults developing in the system. 
The basic changes in the equipment at the swnds were, first, the provision 
of a pre-set display head on which could be set up, by push-button mechanisms, 
the amounts of products required to be loaded into the various compartments 
of the road tanker-vehicles. This pre-sel head incorporated various other 
features e.g. a push-bullon device 10 record and indicate the loading authorily 
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number. control buttons and indicator lamps as well as additional switches 
for special mixtures. More particularly it included a spring-loaded drawer 
into which was required to be insencd the driver's coded personal card (the key­
card) which was scanned electronically to determine whether it was authorised, 
the system being such t hat if it were not acceptable it was not possible to draw 
product from that side of the loading stand. The system was set up only to 
accept authorised cards which, in the event of any being lost, could be locked­
out as required so preventing unauthorised use. The pre-set head is shown in 
Plate Nos. 5, 6 and 7. 
Provided that the correct sequence of operations was carried out on the 
loading stands the driver could then obtain the products he required. Electrical 
interlocks prevented the system operating i.e. product being obtained, unless 
all relevant steps were valid. The various steps required to obtain product 
are shown in the operating instructions (which are a modified version of those 
displayed in Plate Nos. 6 and 7) in Plate No. 8. 
Secondly, each loading arm assembly was fiued with an automatic valve 
which, instructed from the prc-set head by pressing a 'ready' button, began to 
deliver product until towards the end of the pre-set amount an injected signal 
reduced the rate of flow by about 80 per cent. A second signal caused the valve 
to close when the full amount had been delivered. In the event that it did not 
close automatically a safety device in the form of a trip-wire running along the 
stand overhead could be pulled by the driver so causing the valve to close and 
delivery of product to cease. 
Associated with the loading stands was recording, controlling and over­
seeing equipment, which was housed in the main administrative and control 
building immediately to the west of the loading stands and distant about 75 feet 
therefrom. The electronic equipment, switch and control gear was contained 
in a switch room situated on the ground floor. This was provided with two 
doors, both kept locked. Keys of this room were i n  the c,ontrol of the Plant 
Supervisor ; access was denied to all but authorised personnel. The switch room 
was windowless and hence the loading stands were not visible from it .  
Recording and overseeing equipment was housed in the control room on 
the first floor, above the switch room. I t  was provided with windows on three 
sides giving a good view of the whole of the area of the terminal in which the 
loading stands were situated. 
Data were transmitted automatically from the loading stands to a memory 
store in the switch room. The removal of a key-card from the pre-set head on 
the stands caused these data to be printed out in the control room by an auto­
matic typewriter. which recorded all the details of the products taken. This type­
writer, in ordinary working, recorded in black except when there was a fault 
in the system or there was a quantity error ; the print-out then appeared in red. 
Every twenty-four hours, at midnight, or at any time on demand, the type� 
writer printed out, also in red, the accumulated products' total. 
A display, known as the 'mimic' panel (plate No. 9), enabled the 
Shift Supervisor to oversee the operations on each of the stands. by operating 
a rotary switch. Lamp signals indicated the situation on each loading arm at 
each stand and any common faults that prevented the system operating. A 
separate light signal indicated whether there was a typewriter fault. 
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Audible alarms in the control room were also associated with the lamp 
displays in order to draw the aUention of the staff to faults in the system. They 
were of t wo kinds 
(a) an intermittent alarm which indicated an invalid key-card and 
(b) 3 continuous alarm which indicated a fault on the loading bays. 
In combination with lamp signals the alarms also indicated a typewriter fault 
or a system faull. 
A switch was provided to by-pass the typewriter if necessary so allowing 
the remainder of the system to function if otherwise it were free of faults. 
,In these circumstances data were retained in the memory store and were re­
covered to print out on the typewriter automatically when it was restored, 
working, to the system. The memory store had the drawback, however, of 
limited capacity. 
A talk-back system was provided to keep the control room in communica­
t ion with the loading stands. 
Loading-manual control 
In  the event of a fault deVeloping in the automatic system which could 
not quickly be put right, provision was made to enable a change to be made to 
manual control. This meant putting the automatic valve out of action on each 
arm and incorporating in the loading arm a valve which could be operated 
manually (Fig. J). This manual valve, which was infinitely variable so allowing 
full control of flow, was placed downstream of the automatic valve which in 
manual control had to be held wide open. Flow of product on manual control 
then came directly under the control of the driver through the manually operated 
valve. In use it had physically to be held open against a spring; when the 
driver released the valve-lever the valve closed of itself and hence the lever 
functioned as a dead-mao's handle. 
In  manual control the driver earthed his vehicle, zeroed a meter in the 
flow system, opened the manhole of the compartment he wished to fill, placed 
the loading arm within and loaded the compartment by opening the manual 
valve until the meter recorded the amount required. He then released the valve 
lever when the valve closed and further flow of product ceased. Other com­
partments were then filled in the same way until his load was complete. As 
filling data, in these circumstances, were not automatically recorded, his load 
had then to be checked by the plant operators. 
Cbange from automatic to manual control 
In manual control the automatic valve had to be fixed wide open on each 
loading arm. This change was made i n  one of two ways: 
(a) by means of subsidiary valves adjacent the automatic valve; these 
could be adjusted to hold the valve fully open. The subsidiary valves 
were kept padlocked and access to the keys was denied to all but 
authorised personnel. The method, however. meant that each valve 
had separately to be attended to, and in the event of the whole system 
having t o  go over to manual the operation was laborious and t i me­
consuming. A second method was, therefore, introduced in February. 
1967, 
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(b) whereby it simple electrical switch for each loading arm served to 
energise solenoids which kept the automatic valve in the fully-open 
position. These switches were brought to a central switch-board 
mounted in the switch room. From this central switch-board all  or 
any of the loading arms could be changed to manual control by 
operating the appropriate switches (Plate No. 14). 
Automatic/Manual control 
There was, however, an important difficulty in that, as the manual valve 
had to be wide open in automatic loading, just as the automatic valve had to 
be wide open in manual loading, the valve lever was fitted with a cam after 
which the valve, when opened, could only be closed by deliberate intent, i.e. 
the cam did away with the dead-man's handle feature. The automatic valve 
then controlled the whole of the filling operation, and the systcm as then 
arranged permitted any number of tank compartments, up to the number of 
loading arms on the stand, to be filled simultaneously. This arrangement 
had the drawback, however, that if loading were on automatic control and, 
at the end of loading a vehicle, the manual valves were not closed and the 
switches were operated to change from automatic to manual control, product 
would then How through any loading arm in any of the product lines that had 
an arm in the down position, for in this position the mercury switch on the 
loading arm would have actuated the pumps. Gross spillage would then have 
resulted. 
For this reason the central switch-board was mounted in the switch 
room, the keys of which were held by the Plant Supervisor. The switches 
too were on a special board contained in a locked box, the keys to which were 
also held by the Plant Supervisor who, in the absence of engineering staff. 
would make the change to manual as and when required by the Shift Super­
visor. Within the box was a flap which had to be raised in order to operate 
the switches. Warning notices had been paintcd on the outside of lhe box and 
at every conceivable place within, drawing attention to the necessity for the 
manual valves to be closed before the switches were operated (Plate Nos. 
10-14). 
Approval of tbe inSlaUation 
The policy for the use of multi-compartment loading was formulated 
at  Company Board level. The responsibility for drawing up the necessary 
specifications, getting the equipment and overseeing its installation lay with 
the Development and Services Section of the Engineering Department of the 
Company. The decision to change from individual adjustment at Ihe loading 
stands to central switching was made by this Section with the approval of the 
Safety Officer of the Company and by the Terminal management. While the 
automatic system was accepted by the Local Authority who had studied its 
operation, the installation of a central switch-board had not been notified 
to  them. Nor, indeed, was its existence known to the senior officer in charge 
of all conlrol room staff; the Safety Officer on the plant had not been consulted 
in regard to its installation nor with regard to safety aspects of the equipment 
or of its operation, although he had observed it operating and it appeared 
to him to be satisfactory. 
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Circumstances leading up (0 and attending the accident 
Installation of the new equipment at the Terminal was completed by 
December, 1966. Actual working of the equipment started on 1st January, 
1 967 and continued under contractors' and Company engineering control 
on site until towards the end of March. Just before the Easter holiday ( March 
23rd) the last of the Company's engineers still on site told the Terminal manage­
ment that the installation was then working satisfactorily and that the staff 
had been instructed. Accordingly the contractors' engineers were being with­
drawn and he, himself, was also about to leave. He returned after the holiday, 
at which time :1 typewriter fault had developed which the Terminal staff had 
been able to clear by themselves. On 30th March the engineer reported to 
headquarters in London that everything was running normally and, in conse­
quence, he proposed to leave finally. 1t was agreed with the Terminal manage­
ment that he should leave on 3 1 st March at which time it was then the intention 
that another engineer at headquarters should remain on call in case any f- mther 
difficulty arose. 
From 1st April, therefore, the new installation was under the sole control 
of Terminal personnel. At that time the Terminal management was prepared 
to accept the equipment if it ran seven days trouble free, and so notified head­
quarters. 
On 1st April two senior officials were in charge of operations at the Ter­
minal. First the Shift Supervisor, who was in overall charge of the site and 
whose special duties were in the control room dealing with control of filling 
operat ions, planning transport and carrying out checks on the system. Secondly, 
the Plant Supervisor who, with his staff, was responsible for all the plant on 
the Terminal including the loading bays and operations on these bays, which 
involved checking of some vehicles and loads notably those concerned with 
delivery of aircraft fuel. 
Both of them came on duty on ht April, 1 967 before 06 00 hours and 
took over from their night shift colleagues with everything running normally. 
The Plant Supervisor found that, owing to sickness and leave, he was two men 
short of his staff of four but just before 07 00 hours one other man came in 
on overtime to help out, still leaving him, however, lacking one man OD his 
shift . 
Normal running continued until just before 07 00 hours. At that time 
one of the drivers on the stands (Bay 1 5  or 17) found that delivery of petroleum 
spirit into his vehicle was slower than usual, a fact that he ascribed to perhaps 
a dirty filter in the loading system, as had happened before. and accordingly 
he did not report it at the time. This occurrence, however, I believe to be the 
first symptom of the trouble that was to develop. 
At about the same time another driver (on Bay 3) was called up on the 
talk-back equipment from the control room which informed him that he was 
loading the wrong product. The typewriter was showing that kerosene was 
being loaded whereas the driver confirmed that he was loading virgin naphtha. 
The control room reported again that the wrong product was being loaded 
but the driver knew that this must be an error in the record for he was in no 
doubt as to what he was loading. The Plant Supervisor came past the stand at 
that time and at the driver's request checked the load. The driver was right and 
the record was wrong. 
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I n  B3Y No. 16the driver was able 10 load his vehicle and the record (Appen­
dix 2) showed that this was completed at 06 56 hours. Meantime in Bay No. 2 
the driver was able to complete part of his load and then found that he was 
unable to get more product from the system. The driver who drew into Bay 
o. 16 after 06 56 hours was unable to get product as indeed was the driver 
adjacent to Ihe driver on Bay No. 2 (Bay No. 3). Other drivers somewhat 
later also failed. The control room was notified. 
Meantime i n  the control room an audible alarm sounded as a continuous 
note which indicated that there was a fault on a loading bay. but a lamp signal 
simultaneously appeared at the side of the teletype and this showed that the 
fault was on the typewriter. The Shift Supervisor therefore went to the switch 
room with an instructional pamphlet (Appendix 3) which told him how to 
correct a fault on the typewriter by operating certain switches in a definite 
order within a special cabinet. He carried out the procedure without, however. 
clearing the fault. I n  these circumstances he went to the Plant Supervisor and 
told him of the trouble. suggesting. on account of the difficulty, that it would 
be necessary to go over to manual operation. The Plant Supervisor pointed out, 
however. that he was short of staff that morning and as, on manual control. 
the loads would need checking there would be a hold-up in the How of trucks. 
With that they both went to the switch room and went through the procedure 
to clear the typewriter fault, again without success. 
At this same time the 'mimic' panel was showing what appeared to be 
another fault namely that an invalid key-card was being used. The Shift Super. 
visor went to the bay ( o. I) and went through the loading procedure anew, 
pulling the key-card once again in the special drawer i n  the pre·set head, but 
still product was unobtainable. At that he went back to the switch room to 
check on the card and found that it was not locked·out i.e. it was a valid card 
and hence was not the cause of the failure. 
\Vhile this was going on, most of the drivers, at the suggest ion of the control 
loom, had retired to  the canteen where they waited until the loading system 
could again be m;:lde to operate. The vehicles were len al the stands. nearly 
every bay being occupied (Fig. 2) 
The Shift Supervisor having failed to find and correct the fault. or faults, 
decided to have one more try to continue loading �lnd asked the drivers to 
return to the stands. re·set the equipment and see whether product could tben 
be obtained. The attempt failed and product was still unobtainable. Whercat 
all but a few oftbe drivers returned again to  the canteen. At that time, therefore. 
all but one of the bays were occupied by vehicles and there were in all nine 
drivers still left on or by the stands waiting for the fault to be corrected so that 
loading could proceed. There was also one driver in his vehicle waiting to go 
into Bay No. 1 2  and another driver with his vehicle waiting to go into Bay 
No. 14. Both these bays at the time were occupied. 
Then having failed to clear the typewriter fault by the procedure laid down, 
and being faced with what appeared to be a second incurable fault and a system 
that, on automatic. would not yield any product, the Shift Supervisor and the 
Plant Supervisor mutually agreed that they would have to  go over to manual 
operation. The Plant Supervisor thereupon asked the Shift Supervisor to tell 
the drivers to go and close the manual (EM CO) valves on the loading arms, and 
told one of his men to  go to the loading bays and check that they were closed. 
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He t hen went to his office to fetch the key of the special cabinet which housed 
the switch-board and returned to the switch room. On his way back he met a 
group of drivers and inquired whether the valves were closed. They confirmed 
to him that they were. He, however, did not check with the other two men he 
had sent out. 
In  the switch room he opened the cabinet and operated the switches. 
Shortly afterwards he heard an explosion and, going outside, saw a fire on the 
loading stands with flames across the yard towards the office building. He went 
immediately to one of the emergency stop-buttons and, pressing it, stopped the 
pumps supplying product to the stands. 
Meanwhile the plant operator had gone to the loading stands as instructed 
to check that the valves were closed. Starting at Bay No. 1 8  he said that he 
closed one or two of the valves himself while calling to other drivers to do the 
same to theirs. He went the whole length of the stands and was on his way back 
to lhe office when he heard a crash behind him which he said was due to a loading 
arm hitting the ground. Looking back from a distance of 10  to  1 5  feel from the 
stands he saw loading arms falling to the ground while discharging product. 
He then saw a flash somewhere between Bay I J to 14 and an immediate fire. 
At this time also, about 0730 hours, the Shift Supervisor was in the canteen, 
having just asked the drivers to go to the stands and check that their manual 
valves were closed. While he was doing this a number of them called out that 
petrol was overflowing on the stands. When they all  turned to look they found 
that petrol was overflowing from tank compartments and was discharging from 
a number of loading arms, which were i n  process of falling to the ground. 
Shortly afterwards there was an explosion and a fire which seemed to star! in or 
about Bay No. 1 3  and very quickly almost the whole of thc stands were i nvolved 
together with the vehicles standing there. 
One of the vehicles, that standing in Bay No. 2, ran away, probably started 
up by the fire as i t  was a diesel tanker and it had been left in gear, crossed the 
yard and finished astride the overground pipe�lines where i t  remained blazing. 
Understandably there was a degree of panic amongst the personnel at the 
sight of what must have been an enormous fire. Many of them sought escape 
from the premises via the tank farm or over the fence. Fortunately there were 
a number with sufficient control to deal with those badly injured in the fire, 
to summon the fire brigades and ambulances and get the injured off to hospital, 
to close the product valves on the lines from the tank farm and to prepare fire­
fighting facilities in accordance with standing orders. The situation was dealt 
with as well as could be expected in the circumstances. 
The explosion was heard at the Fire Station on London Airport and fire 
was reported to the Station Officer from the airport watch tower. On his own 
initiat ive this officer, Mr. F. W. Williams, and twelve men set out across the 
airport with a foam tender, a water tender and another appliance while asking 
his headquarters to request the London Fire Brigade to provide stand-by 
cover during his absence. He arrived, with his men, within a few minutes of the 
fire starting. He was able to sweep the loading bays with a super jet from the 
foam tender and keep the fire under control pending the arrival of reinforce­
ments from the public brigades. He also dealt with the other potentially very 
dangerous situation i n  which the blazing tanker was astride the pipe-lines 
taking products out of the Terminal. 
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The initiative and resource of this officer were of a very high order and 
reflect the greatest traditions of the Fire Service. His action prevented a more 
serious accident, serious though the existing situation was. He is worthy of the 
highest commendation. 
Very shortly the outside brigades arrived, first from Staines at 0742 hours 
to be followed by others from the London and Surrey Fire Brigades. The 
Divisional Officer from Surrey arrived at 0753 hours and assumed overall 
command. 
The fin was tackled with great skill and resolution and was finally extin­
guished by about 08 40 hours, that is about one hour after the fire started. That 
i t  was so extinguished is a great tribute to the conduct and training of the Fire 
Service no less than to the leadership displayed. In  these days when the Fire 
Service is taken so much for granted, it gives me more than usual pleasure to 
record the expressions of undisguised adm irat ion of the Fire Service made to me 
by Esso personnel during the course of the inquiry. 
Result of Ihe fire 
The casualties and material damage to  the Terminal have been referred 
lOo The fire put the Terminal out of commission with regard to road deliveries 
until temporary facilities were erected, with the approval of the local authority, 
and taken into use on 8th June, 1 967. Re-building of permanent facilities is 
under consideration at the present time. 
Cause of tbe spillage 
The first thing observed at the stands was gross spillage of petroleum 
products from the loading arms, some of which were discharging into com­
panments of the road tan.kers while others were discharging freely on to the 
ground at what must have been the maximum rate of 500 gallons per minute 
for each loading arm involved. 
Examination of the central switch-board which enabled any or all of the 
loading arms to be switched from automatic to manual control and vice versa, 
disclosed that all save onc were in the down or "manual" position thus showing 
that the change to manual control had been effected. The cabinet housing this 
switch-board was found to be locked and inquiry established that this was the 
position of the switches at the time of the accident. 
In operating the automatic system it was clear from many drivers' state­
ments that, notwithstanding instructions from the management, reliance was 
placed on the automatic valves and, not infrequently, the manual valves were 
left in the locked-open position after loading of vehicles was completed. The 
spillage can only be accounted for on the assumption that this state of affairs 
existed at the time the switch-over to manual control was made. 
Examination of the stands on the day following the fire, and subsequently, 
showed that a number of valves on the loading arms were in the locked-open 
position but, in the absence of knowing to what extent they had been interfered 
with following the fire, it is not known how many were open at the time of the 
fire; it was presumed from the evidence that some, at any rate, were in fact open. 
As explained in the description of the premises, if these valves were open 
and the system were switched to manual operation, then product would dis­
charge from every loading arm, whether in the hoisted position or not, that was 
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on a product line which had one of the loading arms in the down or filling 
position, for the mercury switch on that loading arm would have started the 
product pump. 
Undoubtedly some of the valves were open and undoubtedly the switch­
over to manual control had been made. The spillage is thus fully accounted for. 
How many of the loading arms and how many products were involved is not 
known. 
Tbe origin or tbe fire 
The reason for the large spillage of petroleum products are clear enough. 
namely that the system was switched from automatic to manual loading when 
some of the loading arms were in the down position, and hence had actuated the 
pumps, while at the same time the manually operated valves on a number 
of loading arms had been left open, so allowing discharge of producl. 
Close questioning of witnesses produced the unanimous opinion that the 
fire originated in onc of the bays; it did nOl start from outside. The belief 
was that it started somewhere in Bays Nos. 1 2-14 with a considerable balance of 
opinion in favour of Bay No. 1 3  
The reason for the products going on fire is less clear but ncvertheless 
a selection can be made from possible causes as to indicate the most likely 
cause. or set of circumstances, that would bring it about. The possible causes 
may be I isted as follows: 
(a) Smoking, or the lIse of matches, at or in the vicinity of the loading 
stands; 
(b) An open flame or other such source at some distance from the stands: 
(c) An electrical fault in the equipment of the stands; 
(d) An at mospheric discharge; 
(e) Electrostatic discharge ; 
(f) A spark generated from a falling loading arm 
(i) as it struck the ground 
(ii) as it struck a tanker or part of a stand on i Is way to the ground; 
(g) From a road tank-wagon near to the stands. 
Of these possible cn.uses there was no evidence to suggest that there was 
smoking or matches being used at or near the stand, nor was there any evidence 
of an open flame or similar source more remote from the stands as could lead 
to an ignition. They have, therefore. been rejected as possible causes. Equally. 
OD the morning of the accident there were no at mospheric electrical disturbances 
reported from the Meteorological office in the area of the West London Terminal 
(Appendix 4) and, in consequence, weather condit ions have also been eliminated, 
That leaves four possibilities which will be examined in turn. 
A n  electrical (aull in the equipment o( the stand 
Each loading stand was fitted with electrical equipment fed by current­
carrying cables running in a trench beneath the stands from end to end of the 
installation. This trench was connected by two trenches to the switch room in 
the main building opposite the stands and contained power and control cables 
linking the switch room to the stands. 
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The whole of the installation was checked through in detail by the Elec­
trical Adviser to the Home Office and a report rendered to me which is reproduced 
at Appendix 5. His conclusions, which I accept, are set out on pages 35 to 37 of 
this report. I have, therefore, rejected a fault i n  the electrical equipment of 
as being a cause of the fire. 
A spark generated from a falling loading arm 
(a) as it struck the ground 
Witnesses gave evidence of the fall  of a number of loading arms some 
of which, now.bly onc on Bay 1 3, were said to have fallen to hit the ground 
with some force, and the possibility, therefore, arises of the generation of a 
frictional spark as they hit the ground. 
Each terminal pipe of the loading arms was made of aluminium alloy. 
The bottom of the open end was provided with a moulded isoprene-rubber 
cushion pad held in position by an aluminium band secured to the pipe by 
bifurcated rivets. The specification called for rivets rn3de of aluminium, but 
examination of the loading arms disclosed that some of the rivets had rusted 
and it was established t hat they were, i n  fact, made of cadmium-plated mild-steel. 
I t  is possible, therefore, that a spark could have been generated from one of these 
rivets or, as a very remole possibility. minute particles of aluminium alloy could 
have been struck off and they subsequently, as they may have been pyrophoric in 
nature, became incandescent by oxidation in the air. 
While the generation of a spark from the rivets remains a possibility, 
It must be borne in mind that the reason for the fall  of the loading arms was 
due to product being pumped through them and issuing from the open ends. 
Bearing in mind that there is only a very narrow range of concentration of 
petroleum-spirit vapour in air (2 %-9%) in which the mixture is inflammable, 
had there been a spark at the open end of the pipe it is considered that the 
possibility of it setting fire to the petroleum-spirit was not very high, due to the 
fact that the concentration of petroleum-spirit in the air would probably have 
been well above the inflammable range. 
(b) as it struck a tanker or part 0/ the stand 
Aluminium, even in the form of some of its alloys, is capable of genera­
ting incendive sparks, as has been known for many years, by frictional contact 
with rusty iron ; a mixture of aluminium powder and iron oxide forms the 
well-known thermite mixture. Experimentally, a streak of aluminium on a 
rusty iron surface, and variations of t his technique, will readily yield, by a 
glancing blow, sparks of high energy which can ignite mixtures of inflammable 
gas with air. 
Examination of lhe stands showed many places with a sufficient rust 
deposit which could lead, in favourable circumstances, to the incendive spark 
reaction. I t ,  therefore, became necessary to find out whether the actual alumin­
ium alloy used for the pipes could produce such sparks. 
Samples of actual pipes were submitted to the Superintendent of the 
Home Office Branch of the Royal Armament Research and Development 
Establishment at Woolwich who carried out experimental work on which he 
reported. His report is reproduced at Appendi.x 6. 
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The experiments showed that: 
(i) When the pipes were struck against rusty iron and steel surfaces, 
large sparks or flashes were produced ; 
(ii) Aluminium on a rusty surface could produce, when struck, sparks 
which ignited a methane/air mixture: 
(Iii) Smears from the pipes on a rusty surface produced large flashes 
or sparks. 
It  must be concluded, lherefore, that the possibility existed in the conditions 
of the accident for a spark or flash LO be gener:lted which, in the right conditions, 
could have ignited petroleum-spirit. Moreover, it would be more likely for the 
side of the pipe, rather than the end, to come into frictional contact with a rusty 
surface, and a spark, or flash. being generated in such a position would involve 
the risk of ignition, as it  would occur at a little distance from the open end of 
the pipe from which product was issuing. and hence at a place where concen­
tration of inflammable vapour was more favourable to ignition. 
From a road tank-wagon near to the stands 
It  is known that a few vehicles were parked so as to be able to enter loading 
bays when those already in position had filled up and left .  
In two of them, a few feet behind Bays Nos. 1 2  and 14, were two drivers 
waiting to drive into these bays when those already in position had filled up 
and lefl. 
The driver of the one said that he was sitting in his vehicle, with the engine 
switched off, when he not iced one oft he loading arms in front of him discharging 
product. He gal out of his vehicle, intending to close the manual valve on this 
arm, when there was an immediate explosion and flames, at which he turned 
and ran towards the canteen. 
In the other vehicle the driver was sitting in his cab with the engine switched 
ofT when he noticed the rear loading arm of the bay in front of him discharging 
product, and dropping down behind the vehicle in the bay. Fire then seemed 
to come from the ground near to the loading arm to which he referred. He 
immediately started his vehicle, reversed it and drove towards the tank farm. 
Notwithstanding the statements of these drivers that their engines were 
switched ofT, a doubt must remain. \Vitnesses told me that engines of vehicles 
just outside the loading bays were somet imes left running to warm them up 
on cold mornings. The morning of 1st April was cold and, accordingly, it is 
possible that one, or both, were left running that morning. 
Equally a doubt must remain as to whether one of the engines was started 
before or after the fire occurred. 
I f  one, or both, of these engines were running at the time, or the one was 
started up after the spillage occurred but before the fire, either situation could 
have been the origin of the fire. 
Electrostatic discbarge 
The last of the possible causes of the fire at the loading stands, is that of 
electrostatic discharge. 
It  is known that when surfaces are separated charges of opposite sign are 
induced on the separated surfaces. When liquids such as petroleum-spirit, 
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which is an electrical insulator, pass through a pipe-line, charges are induced 
in the liquid for the same reason. Above a critical speed sufficient electrical 
charge may be developed to provide a real hazard if spark discharge to earth 
occurs. For this reason the liquid speeds in the loading arms were kept below 
the 20 ft/sec said to be accepted as the critical speed in  these circumstances, 
and the loading arms and tankers were connected to a common earth. Any 
charge then developed during loading operations would be conducted to earth 
before it reached a magnitude to become hazardous. 
However, at the time of the accident there was free discharge from the 
open pipes, and it is known that significant electrical charge can be built up 
in  these conditions, particularly when the liquid breaks up into drops or it 
splashes as it must do in  these circumstances. I f  then there is a collector and 
a path to earth, flashover can occur of an intensity sufficient to ignite highly 
inflammable vapour/air mixtures. These conditions were present at the time 
of the accident. There was free discharge from open pipes with considerable 
splashing, one of a number of objects could have acted as a collector and there 
was a path to earth through the tankers or through the loading stands. 
Tbe most likely cause of the ignition 
Of the causes that must be accounted real possibilities the most likely 
are considered to be: 
(a) an ignition resulting from the fact that engines of vehicles behind 
Bays Nos. 1 2  and 14 may have been running, or that one was started 
soon after the spillage and 
(b) an ignition resulting from an electrostatic discharge. 
Of these, the coincidence that all the evidence shows that the fire originated 
in, or about, Bay No. 1 3  is too strong to be ignored and I,  therefore, consider 
that the fire orginated most probably with these vehicles. Of the two possibilities 
in  regard to the vehicles themselves I consider that of starting the engine of 
one of them to be the most likely. 
Nevertheless it must also be said that electrostatic discharge cannot be 
dismissed as a possibility, nor that of an incendive spark being generated from 
the aluminium alloy of the loading arm in  the manner described. 
Conclusions 
1 conclude, therefore, that the accident was the result of: 
(a) changing the whole of the loading stands from automatic to manual 
control in a situation where, in a number of loading arms, the manual 
control valve was in  the locked-open position and one or more of the 
loading arms were in the down position, and hence had started the 
pumps, so causing product to be freely discharged from every loading 
arm that had an open valve in  a product line in which the pumps had 
been actuated, followed by 
(b) starting up the engine of a vehicle immediately behind the loading 
stands at the time of the spillage, as the most likely cause of the fire. 
General discussion 
(a) The accident 
The decision to override the individual controls on the loading arms by 
means of a central switch-board, without the most rigid safeguards, was a 
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tragic one. After its installation an accident from that moment on became 
inevitable sooner or later. It may be that on the occasion of this accident the 
Plant Supervisor was at fault in not checking with the IWO men he had himsdf 
sent out that all the valves were closed, before he operated the switches, although 
a group of drivers did tell him that they were, which could have meant, and 
probably did, the valves on the stands that those particular drivers wcre loading 
from. But a display of warnings on the switch-board was only a poor safeguard 
in such a situation, particularly in the absence of an organised plan for checking 
the stands and subsequcntly posting guards to ensure that the valves were not 
interfered with during the change-over. In  my view the circumstances of the 
accident should have been foreseen, and interlock devices built in to make such 
an accident impossible. The fact that warning notices were exhibited sho\\-ed 
that the danger of a major spillage was appreciated, but I doubt that 1 here was a 
full realisation that, i n  the case of such a spillage, there was the possibility that 
the petroleum-spirit could go on fire of itself, by reason of an electrostatic 
flashover i .e .  without the presence of a naked flame source, or that with such 
a large spillage there could be a strike-back from quite a distant source. 
That this switch-board was installed, with the approval of the Terminal 
management and with the knowledge of the Company's Safety Officer, in 3. 
switch room from which the loading stands were not visible, suggests some 
failure to take into account t he basic fundamentals of safety in ope rat ion of plant. 
It would have been expected that the installation of sophisticated equipment 
would have demanded concurrently an organised system of training for all 
personnel, not only for the purpose ofeosuring that they were familiar in detail 
with its operation, bUl that they were also trained to recognise faults that might 
develop and how [hey might be corrected, in so far as might reasonably be said 
to be within their competence and responsibility. Such training should have 
included i nstruction as to the circumstances in which the services of trained 
engineering staff should have been called upon. 
The drivers were instructed in the general plan underlying the new system. 
and were trained in the operations required for loading road tank-wagons. A 
record was keVt of those that had been trained. 
Even though the contracting company's engineers and those of the Esso 
Company were on site over a long period of time, no such scheme of training 
was organised for the operating and supervisory staff, nor was any record 
kept of those who were regarded as proficient either in operating the plant 
or in the recognition of faults and their correction. The Company's engineers 
were available to train staff at the Terminal and, indeed, tried to do so, but 
it was only partially successful. On occasion even when training sessions were 
arranged no one turned uP. as personnel were unable to be spared from the 
daily operational tasks of the Terminal. 
For the most part the Shift and Plant Supervisors had acquired what 
knowledge they had of the equipment from one explanatory lecture, from one 
or two instructions sheets e.g. see that reproduced in Appendix 3 and what 
they had managed to pick up from the engineers in such conversations with 
them that they had had. None could be regarded as fully competent in the 
ope rat ional use of the equipment. 
The standard of instructions issued can be judged from the sketch Appendix 
3 and from Appendix 7 which had been pinned up in the Plant Supervisor's 
16 
room. No operational or instructional manual had been issued by 1st April 
although at that time one had been prepared i n  manuscript and was awaiting 
typIng. 
Of the two members of the staff immediately involved at the time of the 
accident, the Shift Supervisor had had no formal training. He had found out 
for himself how the equipment operated by talking to the engineers when they 
were putting it  in.  He had tried to correct a typewriter fault for the first time on 
1st April. He did not know the location of the central switch-board nor did 
he know the switching procedure. 
The Plant Supervisor had only fragmentary instruction on the new system. 
He had never changed any single loading arm or a complete bay from automatic 
to manual loading on the stands. and had no instructions as to how to effect 
the change by means of the central switch-board. 'What he knew of this he 
had picked up from the Comractor's engineers while they were on site. 
(b) Reporting of accidenlS 
The Company, giving notice of the accident in their letter of 3rd April 
to the Secretary of State as required by Section 1 3( 1 )  of the Petroleum (Con­
solidation) Act, 1928 said that the occurrence was reported lo the Duty Omcer, 
Home Office, Whitehall at 12 35 hours i.e. about five hours after the outbreak 
of fire, after previous efforts had been made without success. A garbled report 
giving the wrong local ion was passed on to  one of H .M. I nspectors of Explosives 
who understandably. from the nature of the message considered that no immed­
iate action was called for. The Chief Inspector heard of the accident quite 
by chance from the B.B.C. Television news broadcast at 1 3  00 hours and 
went immediately to the Terminal. 
The reason for the delay in reporting the accident was not clear, nor why 
the message received by the inspector spoke of a fire at Stanmore instead of 
Stanwell. It may have been connected with the seriousness of the situation at 
the Terminal and the fact that personnel in the conditions there prevailing at the 
time would, perhaps, not be expected to behave normally and pass clear 
messages to the outside. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that the fire was out 
at 08 40 hours, or thereabouts, something better should have been accomplished 
to ensure that the facts as then known were accurately reported to the Depart­
ment or, better, that the terminal staff should have spoken directly to an inspec­
tor. 
When the Chief inspector arrived, sometime before 1 4 00  hours a good deal 
of clearing up had already taken place and vehicles removed from the stands. It  
was impossible, therefore, at that time to form an idea of what the situation 
had been when the fire occurred, nor was it  possible to trace, at the site of the fire, 
what might have been vital evidence, if such existed, as to the cause of the fire. 
h is of the utmost importance that immediate notice is given to the Depart­
ment so that a decision can be taken as to what action it  wishes to  take by way of 
investigation and inquiry. The instructions of the inspector should be followed 
aDd, i n  general, they will be to the effect that ifhe intends to visit the scene of an 
accident, nothing should be done by way of clearing up, except what may be 
necessary to maintain a safe situation, until he arrives. It is essential that things 
remain untouched. In thls way there will be a better chance of discovering the 





During the course of my inquiry into the accident a number of matters 
bearing on safety came under close scrutiny. It will be convenient to deal with 
them i n  turn. 
The general safety standards were lower than it was reasonable (0 expect 
at a Terminal of this kind. Improvements can and should be made by the proper 
conduct of workers, by alterations i n  procedure and in equipment. A training 
and education programme for the workers is called for. 
(i) H;story of the Terminal 
Two serious accidents have occurred at this Terminal i n  about 1 8  months, 
the first in August, 1965 which caused major damage to plant but fortunately 
no injuries to personnel, and the second i n  April, 1967 which is the subject of 
this report. Neither accident should have been allowed (0 happen. I ndeed I have 
to say with regard to the second accident that had the same imagination and the 
t he same zeal been displayed in matters of safety as was applied to sophistication 
of equipment and efficient utilisation of plant and men, the accident need not 
have occurred. 
(ii) Matches, lighters and forbidden articles 
The stands and debris were examined immediately after the fire without 
discovering anything which could suggest a cause of the accident. From the 
debris, however, was recovered an empty book-match cover and the remains of 
a non-flameproof flash lamp. 
In a search of the site, cigarette ends and empty cigarette packets were 
found outside the canteen, spent matches were found in the telephone kiosk 
outside the administrative block, while further cigarette and tobacco packets 
and wrappers were found on the grass verge to the immediate west of the parking 
lot, and on the parking lot itself. It was said that they probably came from the 
waste bins behind the canteen. I was not satisfied with this explanation. No 
explanation was offered for the presence of spent matches in the telephone kiosk. 
Matches and lighters were freely carried on the person at all times, even 
when filling and driving vehicles. This was not i n  accordance with the Conditions 
of Licence; carriage on the vehicle is an offence under the Conveyance Regula­
tions. 
Carriage on the person was no doubt due to the fact that the means of 
l ight ing cigaret tes and pipes in the canteen often did not work, owing to pilfering 
of the electric element, and also to the need of drivers to smoke while away from 
the Terminal. Proper means should be provided and maintained in the canteen. 
(iii) The site 
The site was not of outstandingly good design in respect of the loading 
stands which were all together in one line. It would have been safer 10 have 
sub-divided the risk, say i n  three stands of six bays each. This would also have 
provided the opportunity to separate high and low-flash products on to different 
stands which, amongst other things, would prevent mistakes in loading. 
I n  addition there is much to be said from the point of view of fire-fighting, 
for an echelon arrangement of groups of stands oriented to take account of 
prevailing weather conditions. Appendix 8 suggests that an orientation south­
west would be of advantage. 
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Escape from the terminal was by way of the controlled gates or over the 
fence. The feeling of being shut in and somewhat helpless was stated by a 
number of witnesses, who remarked on the difficulty of gett ing over or under the 
fence. Consideration should be given to alternative means of getting out of the 
Terminal in an emergency. 
(iv) Fire protection 
This is dealt with in detail in the report at Appendix I .  The conclusions 
of the survey were that there is need for a general tightcning up of the firc defence 
arrangements and that the top management should show its concern for 
improvement. 
Elsewhere abroad, water-mist or foam dispersing units are sometimes 
installed al loading bays to keep a fire under control. These may be by manual 
or automatic operation and serve as a useful means of safeguarding drivers 
who, in the event of a fire, may escape with less serious injury than otherwise 
would be the case. Investigation should be made to see whether such a system 
could be developed in the United Kingdom and its probable value assessed. 
More asbestos blankets, strategically placed, should be provided for emer­
gency use, as well as spare clothing, and an appropriate safe place in which to  
change clothing which has become contaminated with petroleum-spirit. 
Proofing of the drivers' overalls against fue might be considered and 
making them more easily removable in emergency. The design of overalls might 
also be improved by the removal of breast-pockets from which things can so 
easily fall. 
(v) Loading stands and operations 
Notwithstanding the previous accident, electrical cable ducts still ran the 
length of the stands. and these cables and junction boxes were found to be under 
water which also contained quantities of oil. Entry of cables to the stands was 
through unsealed earthenware pipes which had broken away to stand-base level 
so allowing entry of petroleum-spirit vapour, or liquid in the event of a major 
spillage, to the cable ducts. The arrangement should now· be changed. 
Consideration should be given to re-designing the loading stands. Escape 
from the rear (eastern cnd) was difficult on account of the vertical steel ladder 
provided. This should be replaced by suitable steps as at the front end. The 
design should be such as to provide the safest means of escape. Overhead 
pipe-lines, valve and filter gear would be the ideal arrangement. 
No reason is seen wby loading arms must come down to ground level. 
A suitable stop would keep them off the ground if inadvertently tbey fell. 
As spill ages occur from time to time and as tbey are, and should be con­
sidered to be, occurrences of potentially great hazard. some re-design of the 
base of the stands should be undertaken in order to confine the spillage within 
the bay in which it occurs. 
Materials of construction should be examined, more particularly with a 
view to replacing the potentially hazardous aluminium. 
Each loading arm is designed to load at 500 gallons per minute. I n  so 
doing the same volume of vapour/air mixture is discharged to tbe atmosphere. 
In the event of a number loading simultaneously, as is not unusually the case, 
a very large quantity of this mixture is released so creating a potentially bazar­
dous situation. The question should be examined as to whether the speed 
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of loading has now not gone too far and whether rates of loading ought not 
to be reduced to more reasonable figures say to a maximum of 250 gallons per 
minute. This might be combined with a closed circuit loading technique, or 
collection of vapour with discharge at a remote point. Such a scheme would 
be easier of accomplishment were bottom loading of vehicles introduced. 
Notwithstanding the importance of closing the manual valves on the 
loading arms, the operat ing instructions on the stands (plate No. 8) 
contained no such reference. The omission should be rectified in the event 
of the procedure requiring it in the future, and in all other cases care should 
be taken to ensure that procedural instructions are clear, concise and complete. 
They should include the requirements that on leaving the stands, other than 
in emergency, personnel must ensure that all valves are closed and the arms 
hoisted, and manhole covers closed. 
In the automatic system it was an essential safeguard that product could 
only be obtained after a proper earth connection had been made. This safeguard 
should be incorporated into every other form of control and arrangements 
should be made for the direct electrical bonding of loading arm and tanker. 
Consideration should also be given to the possibility of adding antistatic 
substances to all grades of petroleum�spirit. 
In  order to eliminate some of the hazard in regard to movement of vehicles 
when loading is taking place a barrier, which could be in the form of a painted 
line on the ground, should be established at a sufficient distance from the loading 
bays at which vehicles, with engines stopped, should be required to wait until 
space were available in the bays to drive in. Some consideration should be given 
to the possibility of ceasing filling on the adjacent bay while the movement of 
another vehicle takes place. 
Spillages of petroleum�spirit at the stands should be regarded as serious 
occurrences. In the event ofa major spillage all personnel should be withdrawn 
from the stands until the spillage had been cleared up and it were certified by a 
competent person as being safe to proceed. I n  less serious cases it might be 
sufficient to close down bays between neighbouring stands. 
The prohibition on tipping excess petrol into the gulleys by the stands 
should be rigidly enforced. 
There was evidence that when the spillage occurred on 1st April, personnel 
tried to close the valves and, in so doing. became drenched with petrol. Person­
nel should be instructed, as part of their training course, that in such circum­
stances where contamination of clothing may result, no attempt should be made 
to  rectify matters on the stands which they should leave immediately and retire 
to the special changing area until it is known that they are free of petrolewn­
spirit. 
I n  the event of a major fault developing in the system, all personnel should 
be withdrawn from the stands until the fault has been rectified and it has been 
certified by a competent person as being safe to resume loading, 
As it appears likely that the vehicle in Bay 2 ran away because it was 
started by the fire while len in gear, it would seem desirable to require that 
vehicles should not be left in gear at the loading stands. 
(vi) Petroleum spirif-vehicles 
After the fire every vehicle was examined and a report rendered to me, 
The summary of the report is reproduced at Appendix 9 from which it will be 
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seen that a number of vehicles using the Terminal did not comply with the 
current conveyance regulations. The Company should ensure that no vehicle 
is permitted to load petroleum-spirit, or to draw into a stand from which 
petroleum-spirit i s  dispensed, unless they are satisfied that it is fully in accord 
with the requirements of the regulations. 
(vii) General supervision 
There appears to be a need for more derailed supervision by senior staff 
of operations on the Terminal and closer and regular examination of the facilities 
provided. 
(d) The automatic system 
I saw nothing wrong in  principle with the automatic system. J was not 
satisfied, however, that the equipment installed at the West London Terminal 
had reached the stage of development that would warrant it  being used for 
routine operations, certainly not on the scale of that required at the Terminal 
which should not be used as a site for perfect ing such equipment. 1 was not 
satisfied either that the full implications of using such a system, in  the opera­
tional background of the Terminal, had been realised; it was clear that the 
staff had not been properly trained to operate it. Moreover, having put the 
equipment in, consideration should have been given to bringing i t  up to opera­
tional standard using high flash-point products. 
The equipment should be looked at again and modifications made before 
such equipment is taken into usc. Study should be made of the safety devices 
in order to be satisfied that they cannot be defeated by any combination of 
circumstances likely to arise in operations. 
(i) The pre-set head 
I found the push-buttons somewhat small and inconvenient to use. They 
could, with advantage, be made larger with larger and bolder figures to indicate 
the amounts pre-set .  
I was told of spill ages of two kinds: 
I. due to wrong amounts being pre-set. One that came to my attention 
concerned a setting of 8,000 gallons instead of 800. This situation 
could be avoided by taking into account the maximum size of compart­
ment at present permitted under the regulations ( 1 , 1 00  gallons) and en­
suring, by appropriate interlocks, that the system, on petroleum-spirit, 
would not accept more than 1 , 1 00  gallons. 
A further development of this would be to incorporate an add­
Itional head on which would be set the capacities of the tank compart­
ments which would override the amounts pre-set so that delivery would 
be monitored and the system, in any event, would automatically shut 
down when the volume of the tank compartment had been delivered. 
2. due to the automatic cut-off failing to operate when the amount pre­
set had been delivered. This could also be avoided by the suggestion 
under I above. 
(ii) Safety interlocks with central switching to manual operation 
I have earlier referred to the incorporation of a dead man's handle into 
lhe manual system. Beyond this an interlock should be provided preventing 
a change to manual control until the manual valves were closed. Moreover, i f  
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the switches were brought again to a central position allowing the whole of 
the stands to be changed at one point, the central switch-board should be placed 
in such a position that the loading stands were fully visible. Each occasion 
for such a change, loget her with I he circumstances requiring it, should be logged 
As some difficulty in understanding the switch·board was experienced on 
a former occasion when some of the loading arms were to be changed, a clearer 
presentation seems to be desirable. 
(iii) Central switching 
I n  the event of all the bays being switched to manual, personnel should 
be withdrawn from the loading stands and guards posted to ensure freedom 
from interference until the change has safely been made. Consideration should 
be given to such withdrawal in the event of switching being required not involv· 
ing the whole of the stands. 
(iv) Training of personnel 
There is an obvious need for training personnel before such sophisticated 
equipment is installed again at the Terminal, or elsewhere. Such trainjng 
should include recognition and rectification of such faults as lie within the 
competence and responsibility of shift personnel, as well as in the routine 
operation of the equipment. Records should be kept of such training with dates 
when personnel were adjudged proficient. Periodic refresher courses should be 
arranged. 
A manual of operation and recognisable faults should be prepared and 
issued to all personnel "passing·out" before being allowed to take charge of 
the plant. 
(e) General fraining 
Some very curious beliefs were expressed to me during the course of the 
inquiry, notably by the drivers. It  would seem, therefore, to be of advantage 
to give all personnel some instruction in the properties of highly inflammable 
liquids. in the hazards to which they give rise and how they can be minimised. 
This would lead to a beller understanding of the rules which are laid down to 
ensure safety in handling these liquids, and would probably promote a better 
acceptance and observance oflhc rules to the increased safety of all concerned. 
(f) Managerial instructions 
Many of these, of necessity, have to be issued to staff. As the control 
staff are very busy people it would help in their control of the plant, and have 
an influence on safety. ifall instructions were codified and put in ready reference 
files so doing away with the bundles of unsorted documents that were handed 
to me for study. 
(g) Dr;,'ers 
Study of the autopsy repons suggested that the medical fitness of all 
personnel to drive heavy vehicles. which may carry up to 6,600 gallons (25 tons) 
of petroleum-spirit, should be checked and the drivers subjected to regular 
medical examination. say at not more than yearly intervals. Those Dot fully 
medically fit should be rigorously excluded from driving petroleum·spirit 
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I recommend that: 
1. the Esso Petroleum Company Limited, should take a close look at the 
general safety measures, including fire-protection and fire-fighting, at the 
West London Terminal, bring them up to a fully acceptable standard, 
and take such measures as will ensure that they are enforced; 
2. the Company should examine in detail the safety measures incorporated 
in their automatic loading system and should satisfy themselves that they 
are adequate and cannot be defeated by operational circumstances, before 
the system is taken into use again; they should examine whether the system 
itself is yet in  a sufficient state of development ;  
3. the Company should institute a proper training programme for its personnel 
and admit to control of the plant only those who are adjudged proficient; 
4. an operations and fault correction manual should be prepared and issued 
to  all staff; 
5. the design and lay-out of the loading facilities and services should be thor­
oughJy scrutinised and such changes made as will lead to greater safety 
in operations; 
6. the whole of the loading operations should be gone into, and changes made 
where necessary, in order to ensure that proper safety precautions are 
observed;  
7. the loading procedure should be examined in order to determine whether 
rates of loading and extended automatic control have not now exceeded the 
bounds of what might reasonably be considered to be safe ; 
8. only vehicles known to be constructed in accordance with current regulat ions 
for petroleum-spirit should be allowed at any set of stands, other than 
one exclusively devoted to dispensing high flash-point products ;  
9. some system of regular supervision of operations and regular inspection 
of equipment and services should be instituted in order to maintain proper 
safety standards. 
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APPENDLX I 
FIRE FIGHTING OPERATIONS AT ESSO WEST LONDON 
TERMINAL, BEDFONT ROAD, STANWELL 
1 st April, 1967 
Fire protection installations and equipment 
The fire protection of the premises is based, principally, upon a system of fire 
mains and associated fixed pumps, serving both hydrants and lank drenchers. 
This installation (sce Annexe), together with a slock of foam compound and a 
number of foam generators, is considered to be a reasonable provision by the 
Company, regard being paid to the low surrounding fire exposure hazard and the 
c�istcnce of additional water supplies in the vicinity which the fire brigade can 
bring into use by means of water reJay operations. 
There is also a provision of portable fire extinguishing appliances. 
An electric bell fire warning system is installed which can be operated 
from any of several positions at the buildings, on the loading stands and else­
where on the site. 
Fire--fighting al the time of the accident 
Many of the persons upon the sile, particularly tanker crews who were 
about to leave the canteen building to return to the loading bays, either saw or 
immediately became aware of the start of the fire, and observed the rapidity 
with which it spread to involve nearly the whole of the landing stands and the 
tankers in the bays. Witnesses said that this unique and terrifying experience 
caused a number of t hem to seek safety by attempt ing to scale the "unclimbable" 
boundary fence ; some actually succeeded in so doing, and a few minor injuries 
were suffered in the process, while others made their way towards the gates or, 
recovering from their first shock, returned to help. 
It  appears that, in consequence, there was no organised attempt to  assist 
at this early stage. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that those who re­
mained on hand not only did all that may have been possible to  aid the four 
men who had been severely burned al  the loading slands, but also undertook 
other emergency action. In view of the stress under which all concerned were 
acting, it has not been possible, from their evidence, to determine the time and 
sequence of events, nor to establish which actions by individuals were taken 
on their own initiative or in response la directions from the Shift Supervisor, 
who appears to have acted most creditably in difficult circumstances, or from 
any other senior person. The fact remains that the public fire brigade was called, 
the depot fire pumps were startcd, the gates to the fire access road were unlocked 
and opened, the doors to the terminal fire station were opened, and various 
valves on the product lines were shut down as a precaution. Also, two tankers 
were driven to safety from Bays Nos. 1 7  and 1 8. 
Action by London Airport Fire Service 
An explosion was heard at the fire station at London Airport, and on being 
informed of the fire from the Control Tower, the Airport fire officer responded 
10 the Terminal with three appliances and twelve men. Since this deployment 
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would have unduly reduced the Airport fire cover, he askcd his headquarters to 
request the London Fire Brigade to provide stand-by cover during his absence. 
The shortest route over the Airport necessitated crossing two runways in use 
and this was accomplished by arrangement with the airport control tower by 
radio. 
On arrival at the fire, the Airport fire officer concluded that the fire on 
tbe loading stands was not likely to spread further, but there was also a tanker 
which had moved forward from a loading bay and was burning near to  pipe 
lines. He therefore positioned one appliance where i t  was possible to sweep the 
loading bays with a super foam jet, and applied his further resources to dealing 
with the tanker, which, following another explosion, moved forward again nod 
straddled a track of five pipelines. 
The airport fire appliances, with a foam production capacity of 7,000 
g.p.m. were eminently suitable for the Terminal fire and, therefore, the fire 
officer decided not to withdraw his men and machines, as would normally have 
been done, when the public fire brigades arrived soon afterwards. 
Action by public fire brigades 
There was 00 delay in the calling of the fife brigade or in the fire brigades 
attendance in response to the call. The predetermined attendance for the 
West London Terminal is seventeen appliances (9 Surrey Fire Brigade ; 8 
London Fire Brigade) and this attendance was despatched, the first two 
appliances arriving from Staines fire station at approximately 07 42 hours. 
The flre situation at this time appears to have been as described by the 
London Airport fire officer with nearly all the loading bays involved and the 
separate tanker fire. The Sub Officer i n  charge did not see any of the injured 
but was told by others on the site that there had been injuries, and that the 
persons concerned were being taken away by ambulances; he, himself, saw an 
ambulance. 
Having immediately instructed his crews, the Sub Officer spoke to one of 
the Terminal Engineers, whom he knew by sight but not by name, and ascer­
tained from him that the flow of product to the loading stands had been shut 
down. Asked whether the terminal fire pumps had been started, the Engineer 
said that he would check and he later reported th.at the pumps were running. 
The officer in charge of the London Airport appliance which was engaged 
in dealing with the burning tanker athwart pipelines, told the Sub Officer that 
they were having difficulty i n  getting water, and the Sub Officer therefore 
directed some of his men to run twin hose lines from one oflhe hydrants to feed 
the Airport appliance and enable i t  to  sustain the application of foam. 
By this time, other appliances and more-senior officers were arriving and 
the attack upon the fire was being developed. A Divisional Officer from Surrey 
arrived at 07 53 hours and took charge of all subsequent operations. A water 
relay from an open supply north of the Terminal was already being set-in to 
supplement the Terminal water supplies and, at 07 57 hours, the Divisional 
Officer sent an assistance message "Make pumps 1 5". At one stage the water 
supplies were not fully adequate to meet the increasing use of water but, with 
the completion of reJays, this was overcome and fires both at t he loading stands 
and in the separate tanker were being brought under control. However, the 
Divisional Officer had the impression that some oil products were still flowing 
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at the loading stands and, at about 08 30 hours, he mentioned this fear to 
the Terminal Manager. Shortly afterwards the intensity of fire lessened and, at 
08 40 hours. the " Stop" mcssagc was sent. 
Observations 
Generally speaking, no unusual fire-fighting difficulties were experienced 
in dealing with this fire; its extinguishment in approximately one hour is 
regarded as very satisfactory. A copy of the fire report form (K.433) shows 
that a total of27 appliances attended and that 1 3  foam streams were used for 
ext inguishment . 
There are, however, a number of points emerging from the inquiry on 
which the following are my observations: 
Fire instructions and fire training 
I .  A file copy of typewritten "Fire Precaut ions" , dated the 19th April, 1966, 
was produced which detailed what should be done by a person discovering 
fire or hearing the fire alarm. It was also said that fire instructions had been 
c'(hibited on the notice boards adjacent to men's locker rooms, but no such 
general instructions were observed i n  any part of the office building. Some 
witnesses denied ever having seen fire notices displayed : others thought 
that they had seen them but had only a very inadequate understanding of the 
fire routine. It would be preferable for printed fire notices to be permanently 
displayed on a separate board and not included with a miscellany of sla" 
nOlices. 
2. Arrangements are in force with Surrey Fire Brigade whereby local crews visit 
the site for exercises and some members of the Terminal staff co-operate. 
I regard such exercises as a valuable means to familiarise members of the 
fire brigade and company employees with the nature and layout of the 
premises, and the fire-fight ing facilities available, and there is no doubt that 
on the occasion of this fire members of the brigade benefited from earlier 
visits to the Terminal. However, other more general training is advisable 
for the Terminal staff to ensure that they have a clear understanding of their 
duties pending arriv31 of the fire brigade. 
The Maintenance Supervisor has overall responsibility for the fire 
protection arrangements at the Terminal, and 3 member of the staff is 
understood to have been appointed as Training Officer but is said to be 
himself waiting to attend a course of instruction; in the meantime it appears 
that no programme of training has been begun. The kind of training required 
would not be extensive, but it needs to be placed on a proper basis and 
recorded to ensure th:'11 all persons are included from time to time. 
Maintenance of fire protection installations 
3. Maintenance of the fire protection installations (not portable extinguishing 
appliances) is undertaken by Terminal staff and is a responsibility of the 
Maintenance Supervisor. 
At the time of the fire the switches for remote starting of the fire pumps 
were out of commission due, i t  is believed, to cable damage caused some 
days previously by contractors on the site and as a result, i t  was necessary 
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shown at what stage this was done. The reported difficulty of an Airport 
fire crew in obtaining water soon after their arrival may well indicate that the 
fire mains were not then pressurised ; this has not been established, however, 
and, in my opinion, the course of this fire would not have been in any way 
affected by such temporary hindrance. 
On any future occasion of failure of the remote starting equipment 
for the fire pumps, i t  would clearly be advisable to ensure that all who might 
be concerned i n  an emergency are informed, that the defect is at once 
recorded i n  the Control Room Log, and possibly elsewhere, and that a label 
is attached to the starter switches stating that manual starting is necessary. 
The Divisional Officer Surrey Fire Brigade, who had charge of this fire, 
has suggested that, as the fire pumps are situated ncar to the point where the 
fire brigade normally enters the site, some visual indication, such as a light, 
should be provided at that position to show when the pumps are running. 
This suggestion has my support. 
4. During the inquiry, the first available opportunity was taken to i nspect the 
fire hydrants and it is considered that the standard of maintenance was poor. 
The hydrants on the fire mains are of the pillar type, with double outlets. 
and in two cases the sluice valves were letting-by so that the pillars each 
contained a column of water liable to become frozen in cold weather. There 
were a number of other defects. 
There was an insufficient number of valve keys for operating hydrants 
and tank drenchers in the vicinity of the tank farm. Some keys may have 
been removed at the time of the fire (though t here is no evidence of fire­
fighting having been attempted by the Terminal staff); they should certainly 
have been restored forthwith so that the fire protection arrangements for 
the tank farm would continue to be effective. 
These matters were brought to the notice of the Terminal Manager 
who forthwith instructed that they be remedied. 
5. I t  was seen that, in some cases, both the outlets on a hydrant were con­
trolled by a single valve. This is a bad arrangement because it  necessitates 
closing down both outlets i n  the event of its being necessary to close either­
for example, t o  replace a burst length of hose or to made some other adjust­
ment to hose l ines. On future hydrants, therefore, each outlet should be 
separately valved. 
6. Portable fire extinguishing appliances are maintained on a contract basis 
by the manufacturers, but there is also a Terminal arrangement for this 
equipment to be superficially inspected by the Plant Supervisor once a 
week (on Sunday). The record of these inspections was produced and showed 
only six entries over a period of eighteen weeks: in some cases dates and 
signatures were missing, and the impression gained is that the matter is 
treated i n  a slipshod way. 
7.  Fire blankets are understood to have been available at the premises but 
not used for the extinguishment of the clothing of the men who were burned. 
I t  is for consideration whether a suitable provision should not be made 
nearer to but not actually on, the loading bays. 
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8. Fire Brigade access 
A special access road from Short Lane to the south end of the site has been 
provided as part of the fire defence scheme originally planned in consultation 
with the fire brigade (then the Middlesex Fire Brigade). 
Onc witness told of his having driven a tanker off the site by this road 
III order to reach safety. He did not, in fact, encounter any fire brigade 
appliances arriving but it is apparent that, had any appreciable number of 
13nkers been removed by this route, there would have been the serious risk 
of the fire brigade being impeded. I nstructions to drivers should prohibit use 
use of the road and, if there would be any risk of the instruction being 
disregarded a guard might be posted at time of emergency. 
9. Short Lane, which leads to the access road, was closed by the police who, 
at a comparatively early stage, placed posts across and a notice, " Police 
Accident", The Police did not, however, station a member of the force 
at this point to allow the fire brigade to pass and, in consequencc,3 number 
of machines were diverted to the main north entrance. Not only did this 
Involve a small detour but, had a Control Point been established at the 
South gate, some loss of control may well h:l ve been caused. 
Conclusions 
There have been no reports from the fire brigades of any serious difficulties 
or deficiencies; indeed, it appears that the fire was brought under control 
quickly and efftciently. 
The circumstances of the outbreak were such as might \\ell cause some 
confusion and alarm on the part of Terminal staff and tanker crews on the site, 
but my impression is that better instruction and training with regard to a fire 
emergency would havc contributed to more orderly action. I t  seems fortunate 
Ihat some of the items mentioned i n  the foregoing 'Observations' did not have 
most serious consequences. There is need for a general tightening up of the fire 
defence arrangements, and it is desirable that this should be tackled urgently 




ESSO WEST LONDON TERMINAL 
FIRE PROTECTION INSTALLATIONS 
Two fixed diesel pumps each of 1 ,500 g.p.m. capacity. draw water from 
a nearby unlimited open supply (a disused gravel pit) and feed through a 
10 ins. diameter pipe to 8 ins. and 6 ins. diameter ring mains. Provision has 
been made for remote starling of the pumps from switches in the Control 
Room in the office building, about 500 yards away. 
The ring mains serve eighteen double-outlet pillar hydrants some of 
which have only a single control valve located at the top of the pillar but, in 
most instances, there is both an underground sluice valve and separate control 
valves for each outlet. 
In the vicinity of the lank farm, branch mains are connected to the ring 
mains to  serve lank drenchers and each is valved at a position outside the 
bund. 
There is also a 3 ins. diameter portable water main supplied from the 
water undertakings system which serves two hydrants in the vicinity of the 
office building. On test, this main has produced a maximum yield of about 
180 g.p.m. 
Foam stocks 
The Terminal holds a stock of 5,000 gallons of foam compound of which 
3,000 gallons are carried in a bowser, 400 gallons in each of two trailers and 
1,200 gallons is i n  cans. 
A number of foam generators and foam-making branch pipes are also 
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METEOROLOGICAL OFFICE APPENDIX 4 
'fEATHI.R COI\DITIOlG AT toNOON AIRPORT (HEJ.'l'HROW) ON 1ST APRIL 1967 
Und Cloud -
Ti •• Dinction Speed Vhibillty TeClp!!rature Relative Amount Height 
(CWT) (d_r;reos) (knots) (yards) (oC) Hw:t.1di� (el&hths) (et) 
l'ellther 
(;;) 
06'5 CiliI 550 -2.2 98 , 25.000 Fog 
061.5 CAUl 2190 -1 . 2  95 .. 25 ,000 >!ht 
0715 300 '" 3060 -<>.6 93 6 25.000 loast 
071.5 310 03 3260 .0·3 .. 6 25.000 ::iou 
o 0 0 
Wind direotion ,hen in degrees from North , vb:- W =- 270 • NW "  ,315 and N • )60 • 
rellperatu.t'e. are taken fro!; 0 therlllOr..eter e:J:posed in a louvred soreen It. ft. above £hort 
turf • 
..ul tius an (j.WT. ad4 1 hour for Br! thh Sw::.:zft' TiIUl • 
• 
I hereby cenify th:u this information has been correctly transcribed from docurnen!s 
In the possession of the Meteorolog.i� Office. 
To;- The Manager 
Engineering Department 
l:isO 'etroleu.c COClp&t\Y Ltd.. 
Victoria Street 












REPORT OF INSPECTION 01- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
at 
WEST LONDO TER M I NAL, STANWELL. 
or 
ESSO PETROLEUM co. LTD. 
I-aLLOWING A FIRE ON ISI APRIL, 1967 
OescriPlion of Installation 
The installatIOn consisted of OInc "sland�". each being capable of accommo­
dating a vclllclc in a "bay" on each side, lhe total capacity 3t one time therefore 
being 1 8  \clllclc� in 18  bays. 
Each stand was provided wuh cable tCrJ11II1aliog arrangements common to 
both bays. Each bay was fitted wilh product loading arms up to a maximum 
of five In  number. The flow of product \\3S controlled b} two Wayne-Smilh 
..,alenold-operated valves on each supply pipe, onc for full-rate and onc for 
reduced-ralC of flow. The jointed product arms were fitled with mercury-t)pe 
le\'e1 switches, to prevent flow of product unless the arm was in  the lowered 
position. The product quanlilY in gallons \\as measured and \\as transmitted 
electrically by Jiskoot pulse tran,nlllers (one per product pipe) to the control 
room. 
Each bay was pro\lded with a panel for selecting and controlling auto· 
mal lcally the flow of product as required. Up to the product supply arms 
could be in  use �imultaneously for one vehicle. 
The electrical equipment common to each stand (t\\O ba)s) consisted of:­
I-Sl1nplex flameproof cable terll1lnat ing and juncl10n box for 24 volt 
3-phase 50 c.p.s. supply for the J iskoot pulse lransnl ltters. Also intended 
for operation of alarm bells. but this facility not yet provided (wiring 
not Installed). 
I-Simplex flameproof cable terminating and junctIon box for 240 \olt 
3- phase 50 c.p.s. supply for solenoid valves for product and for solenoid 
air valves for additives (Ihe Jailer valves nOI provided on all stands). 
I-Non-flameproof cable terminating and junction box for intrinsically­
safe circuits concerned with preset heads. 
2-Non-flameproof cable terminating and junction boxes for fire alarm 
system. 
I-Emergency stop bUll on (to shut do\\ n al l  pump:,). 
Flameproof solenoid-operated Maxseal additive valves on certain stands. 
Electrical equipment for each bay W3S as follows:-
2-Waync-Smith flameproof solenoid-operated product valves for each 
product line. 
l- Mercury-type level Jnlerlod.. switch on each product arm. 
l-Jiskoot pulse transmitter per product line. 
I-Earthing plug on flexible pre-coiled cable. 
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I-Flameproof lighting fitting (Victor Products Ltd. twin tube 80 watt 
per tube weatherproof fitting for Group l J  wired in mineral-insulated 
metal-sheathed cable). 
(Note: Lighting switches were in the despatch department. None on 
stands.) 
I-Product selection control panel (intrinsical ly-safe). 
Cable arrangements 
A common cable trench ran beneath the slands from end to cnd of the 
installation. This t rench was connected by two trenches to the switchroom 
on the other side of the yard. 
Power and control cables from the switchrool11 to the stands were of wire­
armoured type with P. V.c. covering overnll .  Outgoing cables from the terminal 
boxes on the stands were generally of mineral-insulated metal-sheathed type. 
A manhole with cast-iron cover was provided on each stand to give access 
to the common cable t rench. 
Inspection 
A detailed inspection was made of the electrical equipment of each stand 
and each bay. This consisted of inspect ion of each flameproof item, if nOI 
lOO badly damaged, for t ightness of cover studs, cover flange gap clearance 
(if any), and tight ness of cable glands. Items were opened for internal inspect ion 
when it was found that any looseness of cover studs was present. 
All items seen (excluding cables) were either of certified flameproof or 
certified intrinsically-safe type. All cables, except the flexible earth interlock 
cables, were of wire-armoured or melal-sheathed type. The earth interlock 
cables were of rubber or plastic insulated pre-coiled Iype. 
In  the following notes on inspection, items not noted as faulty may be 
taken as being in satisfactory condition as regards maintenance for flame­
proofness, or as being so damaged, destroyed or detached as to make inspection 
from this point of view impossible. 
Notes on inspection 
Stands 1-9 inclusive, 9 total. 
Bays 2 per stand, 1 - 1 8  inclusive, 1 8  total. 
Stand I Flameproof junction box (I) . .  24 volt. 
I-Pyrotenax olive nut . turn loose. 
Gland nuts loose on incoming cables (probably due to melting of 
lead washers). 
Flameproof junction box (2) 240 volt. 
I -Cover stud U turns loose. (Gap between cover and box less than 
0.004 in.). 
1.25" diameter bottom plug loose but engaged for depth of O. 75� 
(9 threads). Plug length 1 . 25'. 
Gland nuts loose on incoming cables (probably due to melting of 
lead washers). 
Bay 1 . .  Flameproof Solenoid valve-I cover nut slightly loose. 
l3 
Bay 2 Fire alarm box-I -cover screw missing. (Box contains 
intrinsically safe circuits.) 
Bay 2 Platform-Flushing hose earthing unit-i -screw missing 
from I.S. cover. 
Note: Fire damage was severe on this stand. 
Stand 2 No defects noted. 
Fire damage not very great. 
Stand 3 Flameproof junction box ( I )  24 \011 .  
l -Pyrolcnax cable olive nut not engaged. 
3-others loose. 
All cover studs slightly loose. 
Cover removed. No signs of electrical flashover inside, but evidence 
of heat damage to drier bag and PVC terminal number tags. 
Bay 5 Some cable gland nuts missing. 
Bay 6 Solenoid valve flameproof junction box-I-cover stud 
of 4 missing. 
Box opened. Much heat damage inside but terminals tight. 
Brass gland nuts mchcd. 
Note: Severe damage by heat to this stand. 
Stand 4 Flameproof junction box ( I )  24 voil 
Flameproof junction bcx (2) . 240 voil 
All studs on lids tighl. 
Gland nuts tight where cables not too badly damaged 1 0  check. 
I-Wayne·Smith junction box missing (due to heat damage). 
Bays 7 and 8 Except for fire damage, nothing noted. 
Note: Much heat damage to this stand. 
Many incoming cables badly damaged, and some burnt off 
completely. 
Stand 5 Flameproof junction box ( I )  24 volt 
Flameproof junction box (2) 240 voil 
All studs on lids light. 
Bay 9 .  I-junction box for Wayne·Smith solenoid missing. 
Note: Much damage by heat to incoming cables. 
Stand 6 Flameproof junction box (2) 240 voil 
2-studs on lid slightly loose. 
Lid removed. Inside of box badly charred. Copper conductors and 
cable braiding intact. 
No indication of internal fault. 
Flameproof junction box ( I )  . . 24 volt 
Lid removed. Condition similar 10 240 volt box. Possible internal 
fault but no positive indication. 
Bay I 1  . .  Meter No. 2-Wayne·Smith flameproof junction box 
on incoming s ide-one cover stud missing-flange 
gap over nearly half the circumference (i.e. 3" length) 
was 0.02511' approx. 
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2-Wayne-Smith jUllction boxes missing. 
Note: All incoming cables to this stand badly damaged by fire. 
Stand 7 Flameproof junction box ( I )  . .  24 volt 
Flameproof junction box (2) . .  240 volt 
All studs on lids tight. 
Bay 1 3  and 1 4  All cover studs tight where tests could be made. 
Many Waync-Smith solenoids burnt away. 
Note: Much fire damage. Many incoming cables burnt off or 
damaged. 
Stand 8 Flameproof junction box ( I )  24 volt 
l -Pyrotenax. cable gland with loose olive nut and no olive. 
Note: M uch fire damage to incoming cables. 
Stand 9 Flameproof junct ion box ( I )  24 volt 
Flameproof junction box (2) . .  240 volt 
Little damaged. 
Bay 1 8  Olive nut on No. 3 interconnector Wayne-Sruith solenoid 
Ligbting of bays 
junction box. 2l turns loose. Gland nut tight. 
Meter No. 2 liskoot terminal box having t hree cover 
studs. One stud with stripped thread. Flange gap 
0.01 8"-0.020". 
In most bays the flameproof fluorescent fittings at high level above the 
bays were damaged by heat and water and the glasses broken. The fitting in 
Bay 1 8  was inspected i n  detail. and was found t o  be undamaged and in satis­
factory flameproof condition. 
Cable trenches 
Several of the manhole covers were lifted (on Stands 4, 5, 6, 7  and 9). The 
common cable t rench was found filled with water to within about one foot of 
ground level, possibly as a result of the fire-fighting. 
Electrical junct ion boxes, some of flameproof type, were seen on the walls 
of all manholes inspected. On Nos. 4 and 5 stands the boxes seen were partly 
submerged. 
Information received from Messrs. Thompson and Hall was to the effect 
that no drains are provided for the trenches, and that the water level seen 
may be the water table level. The trenches are inspected and pumped out from 
time to time. 
Conclusions 
As originally installed. the electrical equipment on the stands and bays 
was suitable for the possibly hazardous conditions which might arise, being 
either of flameproof construction or intrinsically safe. 
So far as could be judged in  view of the fire damage, the state of maintenance 
had been satisfactory up to the t ime of the fire, with the following possible 
except ions: 
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I .  Stand 3 
2. Bay 6 
3. Bay I I 
4. Stand 8 
5. Bay 1 8  
Pyrotcnax cable nuts loose (I not engaged). 
l-cover stud out of 4 missing from solenoid valve flameproof 
junction box. Gap not excessive. 
I�cover stud out of 4 missing from solenoid valve flameproof 
junction box. Excessive flange gap. 
I-Pyrotenax cable gland with loose olive nut and no olive. 
Olive nut on Pyrotenax cable gland loose. I-stud out of 3 on 
J iskool terminal box with stripped thread. Flange gap 
exceSSive. 
While as a mallcr of routine all cover studs and cable gland nuts on 
flameproof apparatus should be kept light, the loose items noted had resulted 
In  flange gaps in  excess of the permissible maximum value in  only two cases. 
Onc of these occurred in Bay 1 8, where virtually no fire damage was evident. 
This faull can be ruled oul as a possible cause of the general fire, as, apart 
from the excessive flange gap, there was no indication of damage, such as would 
be caused by flame emission, on the J iskoot terminal box. The other excessive 
gap occurred in Bay 1 1 ,  where onc stud out of four was missing from a solenoid 
valve junction box. Thcre was great damage by fire in this bay. but no evidence 
of emission of flame from the junction box was noted. 
None of the flameproof apparatus enclosures on the stands or bays con­
wined contacts which would cause sparking in  normal operation. The apparatus 
contained only terminals, except the liskoOl pulse transmitters, which contained 
reed switches which arc themselves hermetically sealed in  their individual 
enclosures. 
I t  would therefore have been necessary for two faults to occur simul­
taneously on one item of flameproof apparatus in order to produce ignition of a 
surrounding explosive atmosphere, namely a loose and sparking connection 
or a broken and sparking reed switch, in  conjunct ion with excessive flange gap. 
Ignition could also have been initiated if a fnult had occurred in any 
intrinsically-safe circuit resulting in  excess current leading to sparking or arcing 
in the hazardous zone. A 1 I  apparatus not rendered safe by flameproof enclosure 
was however of intrinsically-safe type, designed to prevent as far as possible 
the occurrence of the type of fault mentioned. No evidence was found to 
indicate that any such fault had occurred. 
I t  is therefore considered unlikely that the fire was caused by ignition from 
any of lhc electrical apparatus on the stands. 
Vehicles 
I nspection was carried out of 20 road tanker vehicles consisting of 14-
complete vehicles. either articulated or non-articulated, 4-articulated trailer 
(tank) units, and I -articulated tractor unit. 
Nearly all vehicles were badly damaged by fire. I nspection was directed 
to ascertaining whether all vehicles were wired on the two-wire system. Balteries 
and battery switches were inspected where possible. and also lampholders. I n  
no case was a n  eart hing connection seen on a bat lery, nor were any single contact 
lampholders noted. 
It was noticeable that the starter motors on many vehicles had been 
severely damaged in  the fire. Parts of casings and interiors evidently made of 
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light alloy had in many instances almost melted away, leaving only the steel 
shaft with sl3rler pinion and spring. 
As nonc of the electrical equipment on the Hhicle::. was flameproof or 
otherwise safe for use in an explosive atmosphere i f  switching, breaJ...age of a 
lit lamp, operation of the staner motor, or electrical fault in any c.ircuit should 
occur during the lime of exposure, initiation of a fire by these means cannot be 




EXAMINATION OF LIGHT ALLOY PIPE FITTINGS 
RECEIVED FROM DR. BLACK. 
I .  I NTRODUCTION 
Four samples of light alloy were received from Dr. H.  K. Black, Chief 
Inspector of Explosives, Home Office on 2 1 /4/67. The samples were as 
lallows: 
(a) 4' diam. light alloy piping, approx. 5'3' long. 
(b) 411' diam. light alloy piping 4" long, attached to a steel collar or coupling, 
4/1 diam. and 411' long. 
(c) 411' diam. light alloy piping approx. 13 11 long, part ially melted at onc 
end. 
(d) A variable dimensional mass of light alloy, which had been molten and 
subsequently solidified as plates. 
E2 RARDE were requested to examine the effects produced by the impact 
between these samples of light alloy, and rusty iron or steel, with particular 
reference to the ability of (his impact to ignite a hydrocarbon-ai r  mixture. 
2. TESTS 
l Lems (0), (b) & (c) above were struck against rusty iron and steel surfaces. 
In all cases large sparks or flashes were produced in air. 
The technique adopted for investigating ignitions of a propane-air mixture 
was essentially based upon the procedure which is in current use at  the Ministry 
of Power, S.M.R.E. Buxton, where it is used to investigate ignitions arising 
from sparks in methane-air mixtures.· I t  consists of striking a rusty iron or 
steel anvil placed i n  a gas chamber which is  filled with the appropriate gas.air 
mixture. This i s  very conveniently done by arranging the anvil inside a long 
narrow metal box which has a fully open top. This top is sealed by a diaphragm 
of cellophane and the gas mixture is introduced. Before sealing, a thin alu­
minium foil-such as used in cigarette packets-is laid on the anvil. Alterna­
t ively. the anvil can be "smeared" with aluminium from any convenient source. 
The smears or foil can then be struck, after puncturing the diaphragm. By this 
procedure S.M. R.E. obtain a high incidence of ignitions in the appropriate 
methane-air mixtures. 
In otlr tests, a propane-air bunsen type burner was used to deliver a com­
bustible mixture directly into the gas chamber, and the aluminium foil technique 
wed for producing the aluminised layer on the anvil. With light or medium 
blows from a small steel hammer ( 1 0  ounce) large sparks were obtained and 
in one instance the gas mixture was ignited. 
Further experiments were carried out in which the alloy specimens supplied 
by Dr. Black were used to smear the rusty anvil. Although large sparks and 
·"The Ignition of Methane-Air by the Glancing I mpact of Metals on Smears 
of Light Alloys formed on Rusty Surfaces", by Dr. D. Rae, June 1 960. 
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flashes were obtained as a result of similar impacts on this surface, it was not 
possible to achieve further ignitions. The lack of further positive ignitions 
is thought to be mainly due to the inability of obtaining an initial strike by 
simple manual means in the correct place on the anvil, with particular reference 
1 0  the inflowing gas mixture. 
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REPORT ON THE INSPECTION OF THE ROAD 
TANK-WAGONS DAMAGED BY FIRE AT WEST LONDON TERMINAL 
metee" road laAA-y,agons were dallli.\ged by fire. Fifteen wefe at the loading 
posil1ons on the bays and four were drawn-up close 10 the stands awaiting 
vacant positions for loading. Three further vehicles were at the stands (at Bays 
Nos. 1 3, 1 7  and 18)  al the start of the fire, but they were driven 3\1. ay from the 
iHea before they suffered fire damage. DUring the course of the fire, the vehicle 
... Ianding at Bay No. 2 ran forward dri\ crlcss. crossed the yard and came 10 
rest straddling the plpe-hnes along the western boundary some 30 yards from 
t he bay. 
Seven of the \chldes were 0\\ fled by the Esso Petroleum Company limited 
and a further four were operated and maintained by the Company under a hire 
.trrangement with their owners, Monkton Motors Limited. Five vehicles were 
operated and owned by Monkton Motor.!. Limited, two others were operated 
Jnd owned by Oil-Heat Limited and the remaining vehicle \\as operated and 
owned by Alfred Manchester Limited. 
Vehicles owned and operated by the Esso Petroleum Company Limited 
These were posit ioned at Bays Nos. 8 to 1 3  inclusive, with one vehicle 
drawn up behind Bay No. 1 3. With onc exception, the vehicles had been 
con.;;tructed in accordance with deSigns approHd by a Government I nspector 
as suitable for the conveyance of petroleum-spirit. The \chicle not so approved 
differed in so far as It  was fitted with a cargo pump whereas the approved 
des1gn did not include this feature. 
The vehicles had suffered extens1ve damage 10 the cabs as well as to the 
fi1l1ngs 10  the mild steel tanks. In some ca�es the shell plates of the cargo tanks 
and the compartment d1vision plates had been considerably distorted by heat. 
It was of intcrcM to note that although the heat and flames had severely 
d istorted the chassi\ mcmber� of the vehicle standing at Bay No. 8, t here 
remained in three of t he four compart ments of I he tank quantit ies of petrolcum­
Spirit amounting to some hundreds of gallons. The fuel tank of the vehicle 
also remained intact and contained a small quantity of petrol. The cargo tank 
of the vehicle at Bay No. 1 2  also contained petroleum-spirit, but in this case the 
quantity was small. 
The cab of the veh1c1e stand1l1g at Ba), No. 10 had been constructed of 
glass-reinforced plastics and during the CO\1Tse of the fire had been almost 
completely destroyed. 
No unauthorised article wa:... found on any vehicle. 
Vehicles operated by tbe Esso Petroleum Company limilcd but o,rned by Monkton 
Motors 
The vehicles were of the same general design, the mild steel cargo tanks 
having ident ical capacities. They wc re "General Purpose" vehicles intended 
ror lhe conveyance of petroleum oils as well as petroleum-spirit. 
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To each vehicle was fitted a plate indicating that the vehicle had been 
constructed in accordance with a design approved by a Government Inspector 
as suitable for the conveyance of petroleum-spirit. 
Each vehicle differed from the approved design in that the steel guard for 
the draw-off taps was fitted higher than the position indicated in the approved 
drawing and, as fitted, the guard would not have provided adequate protection 
of the draw-off taps as required by regulations. Other undesirable features on 
each vehicle were: 
( i )  the back of the cab contained two unnecessary holes which would 
have prejudiced the effectiveness of the back of the cab as a fire­
resisting shield (again required by regulations); 
(ii) the fue-resisting frarnings required to be provided to the windows in 
the back of the cab were provided only on the outside of the cab; 
On one vehicle a non-flameproof lamp was fined between the fire­
resisting shield and the cargo tank. This lamp was not shown on the 
approved design drawing. 
The vehicles at the bays had been severely damaged. The shell plates of 
the tanks were distorted and, in one i nstance. a shell plate had been ripped open 
by the displacement of a division plate within the tank. A number of division 
plates had been displaced, a few having been forced upwards so that they were 
jammed against the underside of the shell plates of the tanks. The chassis 
members of the vehicle on Bay No. 1 4  had undergone severe distortion. The 
tank fittings in may cases had been destroyed by heat. 
The cab of the vehicle standing at the rear of Bay No. 1 6  was severely 
damaged by fire but the cargo tank and all its fittings had suffered only very 
slight damage. 
Within the cab standing on Bay No. 14  was found a key of the usual type 
needed for unlocking the covers of the filling openings on the cargo tank. The 
regulations require that keys used for this purpose shall not be carried on a 
vehicle conveying petroleum-spirit. No other unauthorised art icle was found on 
any vehicle. 
Vebicles owned and operated by Monkton Motors Limited. 
The vehicles were positioned at Bays Nos. I to  4 inclusive and one vehicle 
standing behind Bay No. 3. The vehicles at Bays Nos. I and 2 were rigid vehicles 
whereas the three others were art iculated. All were "General Purpose" vehicles. 
There was no evidence that either rigid vehjcle had been contructed to a 
design approved by a Government Inspector as suitable for the conveyance 
of petroleum-spirit. Unsatisfactory features in the designs of the vehicles were : 
(i) The guards for the draw-off taps were not considered adequate for the 
protection of the draw-off taps. 
(ii) No stout steel guards were fitted so as to protect the lower part of the 
rear of the carrying tanks. 
(iii) In one case the back of the cab contained openings which seriously 
prejudiced its efficiency as a fire-resisting shield. 
Each vehicle had been extensively damaged. The shell plates of the alu­
minium tank of one vehicle had been forced outwards and burst (presumably 
by explosion within the tank) resuit ing i n  two roughly circular holes in the shell, 
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one hole havmg a diameter of 3 feet .  There was also considerable damage to 
the tank fittings as well as to the cabs, one of which had been constructed largely 
or glass-reinforced plastics which had been dest royed. 
The vehicles at Bay No. 3 and to the rear of Bay No. 3 were art iculated 
vehicles of ident ical design. Neither the tractor unit nor the load carrying 
unit had been constructed in accordance with a design approved by a Govern­
ment I nspector as suitable for the conveyance of petroleum-spirit.  
The engine and batteries contained in the cabs were not efficiently screened 
rrom the cargo tank by the back of the cab, neither were the windows in the back 
of the cab fitted in fire-resisting framing as required by the regulations governing 
the conveyance of petroleum-spirit.  No undesirable features were noted on 
the load-carrying units. 
Each tractor unit had been severely damaged by fire. The fittings of the 
compartments at the front of the mild steel cargo tank of the unit standing at 
the bay were apparently undamaged. The compartments contained some 
hundreds of gallons of petroleum (not petroleum-spirit). The fittings at the rear 
of the tank had been severely damaged by fire. The fronl end of the load­
carrying unit of the vehicle standing behind Bay No. 3 had been severely 
damaged. The front end plate of the tank had been forced outwards to a distance 
of about 3 feet from the top of the tank shell-plates. The rear-cnd of the tank 
was apparently undamaged. 
The tractor unit of the vehicle pOSitioned on Bay No. 4 was not of a 
design approved under the regulations governing the conveyance of petroleum­
spirit. The design of the load-carrying unit of the vehicle had been approved 
under the regulations referred to above. 
The tractor unit and certain of the lank fittings on the load-carrying unit 
were severely damaged. The mild steel tank however, appeared to have suffered 
no distortion. One of the compartments of the tank contained petroleum oil. 
No unauthorised an icle or equipment was found on any vehicle. 
Vehicles owned and operated by Oil-Heat Limited 
One vehicle was stat ioned at  Bay No. 5 whilst the other was drawn-up 
behind the vehicle standing at Bay No. 14. 
The vehicle on Bay No. 5 was understood to have been used solely for the 
conveyance of heating oils and diesel fuels and, therefore, it had not been 
constructed to comply with the regulations governing the conveyance of 
petroleum-spirit.  The vehicle standing to the rear of Bay No. 14  was a "General 
Purpose" vehicle nnd its design had been approved by a Government Inspector 
as suitable for the conveyance of petroleum-spirit.  
The cab, the mild steel tank and the tank fittings of the vehicle at Bay No. 5 
had been most severely damaged, whereas only the cab and forward fittings of 
the other vehicle had been damaged to any significant extent. 
No unauthorised article was found on either vehicle. 
Vehicle owned and operated by Alfred Manchester Limited 
This vehicle was standing at Bay No. 7. It was identified as a vehicle 
constructed in accordance with a design approved by a Government Inspector 
as suitable for the conveyance of petroleum-spirit. 
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Extensive damage had been caused to the whole of the vehicle. The cab 
was gutted, most of the fittings for the mild steel tank had either been destroyed 
or rendered inoperable, the tank shell plates were badly buckled in places and 
some of the tank division plates had been displaced whereas others had suffert'd 
severe distortion. 
No unauthorised article was found on the vehicle. 
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